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II

The Slavonic soil cultivators, depending upon economic self-sufficiency and cooperative effort in marshy and forest regions, as well as in the steppes, practiced a system of joint-family ownership of land (zadruga system). But when nomadic warriors imposed their rule over the tillers of the soil, the invaders considered the land over which they ruled to be their property and forced the peasants who were settled on it to pay them tribute in grain and other agricultural produce. According to the expanded version of the *Pravda Ruskaya,* for instance, after the death of a *smerd* (peasant) his sons would inherit the land, but if there were no sons the property went to the prince.

It is possible that already at that time some of the Asiatic conquerors occasionally divided and redistributed the land among the peasants according to the changing size of their families, the ability to till it and pay taxes and tithes. This might have been the most expedient way by which the conquerors sought to increase the income from the lands which they controlled. At the same time the peasants that formed a land commune were held jointly responsible by their over-lords for a predetermined amount of tributes, as well as for criminal acts committed on their territory.

The system of joint community responsibility was a well-known practice in the society of steppe nomads. It was especially applied as a means to procure fines and force the payment of debts. In that social system if a wrong-doer was unable to pay a fine, his nearest relatives, and failing them, the whole camp, had to provide it.[10] Therefore when these predatory herdsmen imposed their rule over the farming folk, they might have introduced the principle of joint responsibility as the most expedient way to collect the tributes and to exploit economically the subjected peoples.

It was by such social processes that the non-warlike and stateless society of the Old-Slavonic agricultural folk was incorporated into a military society of power-oriented horsemen of the Eurasian steppes.

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failures and their sins would fall upon him. He was emotionally and socially dependent upon the members of his family, yet he had to be stern and distant to maintain his authority.

At the same time, the family members were expected to completely identify themselves with the family as a whole. This submerging of the individual in the family collective was manifested, for instance, in the ideas of common family good, rooted in the Old-Slavonic principles of mutual reponsibility and mutual aid of all community members ("all for one, one for all"). The elder brothers were expected to take care of their minor brothers and of their unmarried sisters; the aged or disabled parents were in the care of their children; the father was expected to maintain his daughter-in-law if she lost her husband or if her husband were away.[1]

Earlier, following Mongol traditions, the family was collectively responsible for the misdeeds or crimes of any one of its members.[2] In early Russia, according to the Expanded Version of the *Pravda,* "if anyone attacks and kills another without the slightest provocation, the inhabitants of the district do not make payment for this kind of a murderer, but they shall surrender him, with his wife and children, for sentencing to banishment or imprisonment, and his home shall be given up for plundering."[3] Also later in Muscovite Russia all members of a family were considered involved in the offense of a member.

This complete identification with one's family and this penal philosophy of collective responsibility, of implied collective culpability and family hostages (retained in Russian police practices until nowadays) favored family self-centeredness and self-concern. There was therefore a tendency to draw a curtain of secrecy around the family in order not to expose it to accusations and to protect it from defamation. In the urban strata the master of the household was very much preoccupied with this problem. "Your neighbors will reproach you, and your enemies will rejoice at your misfortune," warns Domostroy. Such family centeredness, which was a result of the ascendency of an autocratic state, favored social isolation and lack of intimate contact with neighbors; hence, it fostered also lack of social trust.

Family centrism, family isolation, and lack of trust in one's

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could be achieved only if Russia was to change radically its economic structure. As a result of such a trend of events and of thought the government passed a decree in 1861 according to which the peasants were set legally free from their masters.

As a consequence of his legal emancipation, the peasant found himself in the possession of less arable land than before, and he was still bound to it. He was overburdened even more than before because he was obliged to pay high redemption dues in addition to the heavy taxes that were imposed on him. Moreover the peasants in land communes not only remained jointly responsible to the government for the payment of taxes, but they were also made jointly responsible for redemption payments. The commune's authority over the peasants was increased and the peasant found himself under an even more exacting and more despotic commune regimentation than the one that existed before the "Emancipation Act."

At the same time the peasant still did not have sufficient arable land. He also lacked pasture grounds and timber which were of special importance in his technologically backward and extensive agricultural economy; most of such land was left in the hands of his former masters. The acuteness of land shortage was especially felt because of lack of artificial fertilizers, need for draught animals, and primitiveness of farm equipment. Many peasants did not even possess a wooden plow.

But though the emancipation act of 1861 still kept the peasants bound to the land, and did not provide them with sufficient land, it did open up opportunities for their economic advance and political activation. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the peasantry became generally recognized as a potentially very significant force, both politically and economically. It was this prospect of the peasant masses as the leading political power of the future in combination with the Slavophil idealization of the peasantry that gave rise to the ideology of *narodnichestvo* (populism). This ideology idealized the virtues and the creative potentialities of the peasantry, and just as the Slavophils, the narodniki claimed that the reconstruction of Russian society, even of the whole world, will come from Russian peasantry.

By the end of that century a faction of Russian radical intel-

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625 political police is under direct supervision of the supreme Party leader himself and is always headed only by one of his most trusted advisers. In a system of prison-like regimentation of all the subjects, a distrustful and fierce ruling faction of professional conspirators can never relax in their watchfulness and must act swiftly and without regard for legal formalities, or for personal or human considerations in stamping out and annihilating all signs of opposition to its rule.

Early in the history of the Bolshevik regime the secret Political Police came to be so indispensable that this institution was identified with the Party. "Every good Communist should be a good Chekist," said Lenin. By the end of 1918 the Cheka (*Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya*) had been reorganized from an organ of investigation into an organ that also resorted directly to "extra judicial measures of coercion, assuring swift and of necessity, cruel repression of the enemies of the Soviet state." In 1922 Cheka, whose terror became too odious, was abolished and supplanted by the G.P.U. which was characterized by Stalin as "the indefatigable guardian of the Revolution, the unsheathed sword of the proletariat."[26] To inform not only on non-Communists but on the members of his own Party and even on the members of his or her own family, became one of the first duties of every Party member.[27] Refusal to inform came to be considered as conspiracy against the Party and the state. A dense net of secret agents and informers became instrumental in preventing social intimacy and strengthening lack of trust.

625 ●672 Following age-long practices of Czarist rule and traditions of mutual responsibility of family members the Soviet political police uses the family members of political suspects as hostages.[28] Any person who had any dealings or connection with a political suspect, even in a most casual or incidental way, becomes *ipso facto* himself a suspect.[29] In Soviet police philosophy and practice every subject is a suspect as an offender or potential criminal unless he proves his innocence. A distrustful and violent ruling clique which is determined to perpetuate itself in power by all and any means must stamp out any opposition regardless of how many non-guilty ones might suffer. An important objective of the political police is therefore to instill fear and terror in the

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hearts of the Soviet subjects and to exert unremitting pressure on them, so that they never relax in their striving to conform to the Party's will. The secret police, in Lenin's words, is "our weapon of assault upon innumerable conspiracies . . . innumerable attempts against Soviet authority."[30]

23
CONTROL OF THOUGHT AND FEELING

MONOPOLIZATION of all social power by the Bolshevik rulers and their failure to satisfy the traditional demands for equality and acceptance has been breeding both apathy and latent rebellion in Soviet society. Realizing that such a development might eventually undermine their power, early in their rule the Bolsheviks proceeded to indoctrinate the thoughts and to control the feelings of their subjects. It became imperative to evoke identification of the masses with Bolshevik leadership and gain their faith, enthusiasm and willing self-sacrifice in support of the Soviet system.[1]

In order to justify this need for ideological and emotional conformity, it became necessary to monopolize the Truth. The Bolsheviks therefore stated that all problems, those of the past and of the present, as well as those of the future, have found their answer in Marxist-Leninist theory. They asserted, however, that since this theory "is not a dogma, but a guide to action,"[2] the Bolshevik leadership is "able to enrich this theory with the new propositions and conclusions, . . . to *develop it and advance* it" and "to replace such of its propositions and conclusions as have become antiquated by new ones corresponding to the new historical situation."[3] And just as earlier the Russian Orthodox Church had claimed to represent the "true Christianity" centered in Moscow, the Third Rome, so now the Bolshevik rulers have usurped for themselves the right to represent the "true Marxism," centered in the Kremlin:

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of the new order. The family, therefore, as all other institutions of the Soviet society, was to be reconstructed and regimented in such a way as to best serve the purposes and the objectives of the new ruling class.

As a result of such a change in attitude and reversal of policy the Bolsheviks have introduced laws and decrees whose aim has been to impose mutual responsibilities and obligations on family members. The new laws have also favored "indissolubility" of marriage ties and encouraged large families. At the same time, however, the family has been placed under the guidance, control and overseeing of the Party and of the government authorities. In consequence of a series of laws and decrees, the Soviet family has been given the task of training children in discipline, in collective responsibility, in obedience to authorities and in faith in Bolshevism. Just as the Soviet school, the Soviet family has been given the task of helping to train willing toilers, zealous labor drivers and agitators, and fearless fighters for the cause of world Communism.[2]

Following the traditions of the Russian patriarchal family and in order to make the parents an instrument of the training of children in obedience to authorities, parents have been made legally responsible for the behavior of their children. Prosecution by civil and criminal law, administrative fines and prison terms[3] have been established against the parents whose children came into conflict with administrative regulations or existing laws. Just as in the Domostroi the parents are encouraged to be strict and non-indulgent, and to rely on frequent punishment as a means of correction; they are also encouraged to be authoritative and to keep a necessary distance from children so that their authority is not undermined by unnecessary intimacy. The parents have been given joint rights of discipline but subjected to government and Party control.[4]

This interference of the Party-state into the family relationships has been backed also by another law according to which parental rights have been subordinated to the interest of children. The "interests of children" are determined according to the Party interests and views; the court has been empowered to deprive the parents of their parental rights whenever the Party

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chooses to consider that the interests of the children have not been safeguarded.[5] In such cases parental rights might be lost for up to five years.[6] According to the Soviet educational philosophy it is expected that the parents will *rear* the children, but that the public organizations under the Party's supervision will instruct and supervise parents in the ways of *Communist upbringing* of children.[7]

The Party considers it to be its duty to arouse antagonism of children against parents when such action is necessary in the interest of the survival of the Soviet regime. As mentioned earlier, planned rift between fathers and sons was, for instance, employed to speed up the process of collectivization. Commissar of Agriculture Jakovlev, speaking before a Party congress on the struggle against the kulaks, stated that "In a number of cases, the children of the kulaks are made to revolt against their parents, and thus the kulak families are divided and the kulaks still more isolated." The Party has also been known to take advantage of family conflicts to encourage the children to spy on their parents and to denounce them to the political police:

> Russian parents had to be very careful of what they said in the presence of their own children, and even of how they disciplined their children. One boy, Pavlik Morosov, was built up as a hero among youth because he had denounced his father who was organizing resistance against the kolhoz. Great propaganda was made about this boy. A book was written about him. Actually he became a hero to most children.[8]

In times of political "purges" there were frequent notices in the Soviet papers in which the children of the parents who were politically persecuted publicly renounced their parents.[9] That was the only way they could escape the vengeance of a regime which had revived the tradition of family hostages and used it as an instrument of political conformity.

The Bolsheviks consider that since "one's way of life is a social matter . . . a matter of national policy,"[10] the Party has the right to interfere even in pre-marital and extra-marital sex relations, as well as in the relations between the spouses. "Young Communist organizations cannot remain neutral when the con-

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do specify the cases in which the state wishes to facilitate divorce and dissolve marriage. Such cases are for instance, "a court sentence depriving either spouse of his or her liberty for no less than three years," and "the absence with no news of either spouse."[18] In such cases the party seeking divorce is exempted from the payment of fees and also from the requirement that a public notice be put in the local newspaper. These provisions are in accordance with the principle of family hostages and the well known practice of the Soviet political police to persecute the families of political offenders. Divorce from such a person may in some cases rehabilitate one in the eyes of the Party. The police as a rule exert pressure on the spouses of political culprits or suspects to seek divorce, and the law provisions are such that the court may facilitate divorce in such cases.

The Bolshevik regime depends to a great extent upon the available large contingents of manpower for its armed forces and for its industrial enterprises whose labor efficiency is very low. In accordance with such needs a series of measures was introduced designed to encourage large families, such as strict laws against birth control, maternity leaves, safeguards for employed pregnant women, monthly cash payments for children, reduced fees in nurseries, advantages in income tax payments, medals, awards, citations, and titles for mothers bearing and raising a certain number of children.[19] At the same time special taxes were imposed upon bachelors, childless couples and couples with only one or two children. Also suits to establish paternity were abolished and an unmarried mother was given the option to accept a modest allowance or to place the child in a public institution where the state takes care of it.

The recognition on the part of the Bolshevik rulers of the significance of the family as an institution of early training of Soviet subjects in discipline, subordination to the group, and obedience to authorities is manifested in the inclusion of family legislation within the jurisdiction of the central government of the Soviet Union. The constitution of the Soviet Union itself was amended for this purpose in 1947.[20] Thus the trend of Soviet legislation in the matters of family relations in the course of over thirty years of Bolshevik rule tended to increase and

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000 authorities as soon as these showed signs of weakness and defeat.

Could it be that lack of acceptance, thwarted and unstable attachments in the Soviet system of rule will bring about the same results? And will the fanaticism, cynicism, and extreme self-concern cause the Soviet "Oprichniki" to play as fateful a role in their own day as their predecessors did in theirs? Will such "Janizaries" become the spearheads of a new plan for world conquest, in the name of a new Allah? Or will they bring about internal chaos and anarchy as soon as their personal power is imperilled? Increasing complaints against misappropriation of public funds and properties, venality of government officials and Party members indicate such possibilities. Disrespect for personal rights on the part of the government bureaucracy and the military, emphasis on hatred in the educational system and the press, and inhuman practices of the political police point in the same direction.

593 On the other hand, the same pressures that work in the direc-
•[672] tion of family tension and of breaking up of family ties might, in certain circumstances, strengthen family attachments and family solidarity. In the police practices of the Soviet Union all those who had any ties (*svyaz*) with a political culprit are suspected of the same crime. It is this philosophy of implied culpability that leads to the principle of joint family responsibility and family hostages in case of political offenses by one family member. It appears that a number of "confessions" in the political trials were the result of a promise on the part of the secret police that the family members of the victim will be spared. Such conditions of consistent external threat if combined with indifference toward Soviet efforts might foster the tendency to withdraw within one's own family circle, to keep the outside contacts to a minimum, and to strengthen the intimacies of the home.

In those cases when changes in family relations take such a trend, the status of the father apparently assumes a different position and function from that which was typical of the Great-Russian patriarchal family system in the past. Instead of the strictness and detachment which characterized the father's role